The Revolutionary era is one of the most studied periods in European history, with tens of thousands of titles dealing with the French Revolution and its aftermath. Lentz 2002–2010 offers the most recent panoramic view of the rise and fall of the Napoleonic Empire. Ross 1986 is a good introduction to the diplomatic history of the era, while Schroeder 1994 is indispensable for in-depth discussion of the political transformation in Europe. Woolf 1991 offers a unique picture of how Napoleonic Europe both functioned and malfunctioned. Connelly 1966 is unique in its focus on the satellite kingdoms Napoleon created. Chickering and Förster 2010 is a collection of essays more focused on warfare in the Age of Revolutions (1775–1815), looking at both sides of the Atlantic and exploring military and social dimensions of warfare. Lynn 1984 is crucial to understanding the French Revolutionary army. Bell 2007 argues that the concept of total war did not start in the 20th century but rather in the Revolutionary era, when Europe plunged into an abyss of destruction.
Bell, David A. The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare as We Know It. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007.
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The book argues that the concept of total war did not start in the 20th century but rather in the Revolutionary era, when Europe plunged into an abyss of destruction. Bell suggests that our modern attitudes toward war were born during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and he traces parallels between the Napoleonic Wars and the modern world.
Chickering, Roger, and Stig Förster, eds. War in an Age of Revolution, 1775–1815. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
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This volume is the sixth in a series of books that derive from conference proceedings dedicated to the rise and reign of total warfare from the 1860s to the 1940s. It offers a rich and stimulating collection of essays written by historians from five different countries. The essays look at both sides of the Atlantic and propose treating the Age of Revolution as one of acceleration and expansion rather than innovation in warfare.
Connelly, Owen. Napoleon’s Satellite Kingdoms: Managing Conquered Peoples. New York: Free Press, 1966.
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A classic study that looks at the populations subjected to French rule, the nature of their collaboration and resistance, and their adaptation to the principles of the Napoleonic project.
Lentz, Thierry. Nouvelle histoire du Premier Empire. 4 vols. Paris: Fayard, 2002–2010.
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A major contribution to Napoleonic scholarship, Lentz’s work offers a panoramic view of the rise and fall of the Napoleonic Empire. Volume 1 traces Napoleon’s conquest of Europe in 1804–1810, while Volume 2 explores its decline and downfall in 1810–1815. Volume 3 offers fascinating insights into France’s relationship with European states between 1804 and 1814, while the final volume guides the reader through the Hundred Days (1815).
Lynn, John A. The Bayonets of the Republic: Motivation and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France, 1791–1794. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984.
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An important study of the Revolutionary army, Lynn’s book challenges the view of the army as an unskilled but fiercely patriotic fighting force that won simply by overwhelming its enemies with its élan and its tactical charges. It examines every aspect of life in the French army, including leaders, recruitment, officer selection, discipline, political education, and tactics.
Ross, Steven T. European Diplomatic History, 1789–1815: France against Europe. Malabar, FL: Krieger, 1986.
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Originally published in 1969. Despite its date, Ross’s book remains one of the best studies on the diplomatic history of the Napoleonic period. Judicious and well written, it will be of good use to students.
Schroeder, Paul. The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
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Hailed as a landmark study upon its publication, this book delves deeply into European international politics and offers a comprehensive and authoritative history of Europe between 1763 and 1848. Considered sharply revisionist when it was published, the book offers a rather critical view of Napoleonic France and explores its impact on international relations and diplomacy. A wide-ranging and penetrating study, it will be of great utility to graduate students.
Woolf, S. Napoleon’s Integration of Europe. New York: Routledge, 1991.
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One of the best studies examining the relationship between France and the rest of Europe during the Napoleonic era. It is a well-written and wide-ranging work that will be of great value to students.
The defeat of Austria, 1800–01
Though Bonaparte had to embark on the campaigns of 1800 with inadequate forces and funds, the weaknesses of allied strategy went far to offset the disadvantages under which he laboured. Austria had decided on an equal division of its strength by maintaining armies of approximately 100,000 men in both the German and Italian theatres. Instead of reinforcing Austrian strength in northern Italy, where there was most hope of success, the British government spent its efforts in limited and isolated enterprises, among them an expedition of 6,000 men to capture Belle-Île off the Brittany coast and another of 5,000 to join the 6,000 already on the Balearic Island of Minorca. When in June these two forces were diverted to cooperate with the Austrians they arrived off the Italian coast too late to be of use.
Bonaparte’s plan was to treat Italy as a secondary theatre and to seek a decisive victory in Germany. It proved impossible to increase Victor Moreau’s Army of the Rhine to more than 120,000—too small a margin of superiority to guarantee the success required. Nevertheless, Bonaparte was busy with the creation of an army of reserve which was to be concentrated around Dijon and was destined to act under his command in Italy. Until he had engaged this force in the south, Bonaparte would be able, should the need arise, to take it to Moreau’s assistance. In Italy André Masséna’s 30,000–40,000 outnumbered troops were to face the Austrians in the Apennines and in the Maritime Alps until the army of reserve, marching to the south of the Army of the Rhine, should cross the Alps, fall upon the Austrians’ lines of communication, cut off their retreat from Piedmont, and bring them to battle. Bonaparte had hoped that Moreau would mass the Army of the Rhine in Switzerland and cross the river at Schaffhausen to turn the Austrian left in strength and obtain a decisive victory before dispatching some of his army to join the force descending on the rear of the Austrians in Italy. Moreau, however, preferred to cross the Rhine at intervals over a distance of 60 miles (approximately 100 km) and to encounter the Austrians before concentrating his own forces.
The Marengo campaign
Moreau did not begin his offensive until April 25, 1800, when Bonaparte was issuing the preliminary orders for the crossing of the Alps by the army of reserve. The urgency of the situation in the south, where Masséna was besieged in Genoa on April 21 and Louis-Gabriel Suchet had fallen back to the line of the Var, made it necessary to send the army of reserve, now en route for Geneva, over a pass further to the west than had been originally intended. An ill-provisioned force of 35,000 men and 40 cannons began transiting the Great Saint Bernard Pass on the night of May 14–15 and completed it on May 25. Moreau, who had been asked to send 25,000 men via the Saint Gotthard Pass, released 15,000, but only 10,000 of them joined Bonaparte’s army on June 1, a day before the French occupied Milan and its extensive magazines.
When Masséna surrendered Genoa on June 4 and sent his forces to join Suchet’s, Bonaparte’s presence in the Austrian rear robbed that success of its significance. The collapse of the Austrian offensive enabled Suchet’s troops to inflict serious losses in what fast became the Austrian rear as Michael Friedrich von Melas turned to meet the army of reserve. A number of oversights in the execution of Bonaparte’s strategy just before the Battle of Marengo (June 14) came close to causing his destruction, for they enabled Melas to concentrate 30,000 men and more than 100 guns for an attack on Bonaparte’s 22,000 men and 14 guns. Bonaparte had had to yield ground, but French general Louis Desaix, responding to a hurried summons, returned to assault the Austrian vanguard with 6,000 men and 6 or 8 cannon. François-Christophe Kellermann’s cavalry charge against the Austrian flank completed the transformation of near defeat into a victory, but Desaix was killed in action.
On June 15, 1800, Melas concluded a capitulation: the Austrians were to evacuate northern Italy west of the Mincio, though remaining in Tuscany and the Papal Legations. In exchange, the Austrians received free passage of their troops to Mantua. While Bonaparte lacked the strength in Italy to impose more stringent terms, the Holy Roman emperor Francis II contracted a fresh agreement with Great Britain on June 20. Malta, which Bonaparte had offered to the Russian emperor Paul three months earlier, fell to the British in September.
The Danube campaign and Hohenlinden
Moreau’s principal columns, having reached the Rhine at Strasbourg, Breisach, and Basel, completed the crossing on May 1, 1800, and advanced along the south bank of the Danube. On May 3 French general Claude Jacques Lecourbe took Stockach, while Moreau defeated Paul Kray at Engen. After a further reverse at Messkirch, the Austrians withdrew, reaching Ulm on May 11. Having lost his advantage in numbers through the dispatch of the contingent to Italy, Moreau rejected a direct attack on the strong positions at Ulm in favour of a turning movement on the right. On June 19 he forced the passage of the Danube between Höchstädt and Donauwörth, thereby compelling Kray to evacuate Ulm. The French entered Munich nine days later and had pushed Kray’s demoralized army back upon the Inn before hostilities were suspended, on July 15, by the armistice of Parsdorf.
At the end of the armistice both sides had armies of approximately 100,000 between the Danube and Tirol. While a Franco-Dutch force of 16,000 from the Army of the Main protected Moreau’s left wing, 20,000 Austrians in Tirol covered his opponent’s left flank. The Austrians forestalled Moreau’s impending offensive on the Inn by launching theirs on November 27, 1800. Moreau withdrew to muster his dispersed forces to meet an attempt to outflank him, and in the Battle of Hohenlinden (December 3) the mobility of the French enabled him to rout the Austrian columns, which lost 14,000 men and 80 cannon. Many thousands more were taken prisoner in a vigorous pursuit. By the armistice of Steyr (December 25) the Austrians agreed to negotiate for peace without Great Britain.
In Italy the French, in contravention of the armistice, had occupied Tuscany in October 1800 on the grounds of British activity at Livorno. On the Mincio front French general Jacques Macdonald arrived from Chur by a bold crossing of the Splügen Pass with 14,000 men to strengthen Guillaume Brune. Brune then moved against the outnumbered Austrians late in December. Having abandoned the Adige (January 1, 1801) and the Brenta (January 11), the Austrians were ready to sign the armistice of Treviso (January 15).
The Peace of Lunéville and the Italian settlement
The Franco-Austrian peace of Lunéville was signed on February 9, 1801. For the most part it repeated the Treaty of Campo Formio (1797). The French frontier was to be advanced to the Rhine, with the proviso that the rulers thus dispossessed should be compensated from ecclesiastical territory in Germany. Compensation was also to be found for the Habsburggrand dukeFerdinand III of Tuscany, who was also to be dispossessed. The Dutch, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian republics were recognized by Austria.
The Neapolitans, who had meanwhile invaded Tuscany, were driven back by Joachim Murat’s force of 26,000. The Armistice of Foligno (February 18, 1801), which forced the Neopolitans to evacuate the Papal States, was followed by the Peace of Florence (March 28), whereby Naples lost little territory but undertook to exclude British and Turkish trade. On March 21, 1801, the Treaty of Aranjuez was concluded between Bonaparte and Charles IV of Spain (who in October 1800 had restored Louisiana to France). Under its terms, Tuscany was erected into the Kingdom of Etruria for Charles IV’s son-in-law, Louis of Bourbon-Parma, and Parma, to which the latter renounced his claim as heir apparent, passed under French administration. Abandoned by the Austrians, Charles Emmanuel IV of Sardinia could do nothing against the continuing French occupation of Piedmont.
Great Britain, France, and the neutrals, 1800–02
The British, in pursuit of their primarily maritime, colonial, and commercial interests in the wars, claimed to have been serving the common cause and had moreover applied their profits to subsidizing the Continental armies, but they had adopted means that offended neutral states and former allies alike. Through their blockade, the British could virtually dictate the terms of European sea trade. When granting licenses for merchant shipping to enter the ports of France and France’s associates, they admitted neutrals only when there were not enough British ships to carry all the colonial produce of which they now controlled the sources. Moreover, the British maintained that a neutral flag did not cover an enemy’s goods and that these might be seized when destined for a port only blockaded on paper. Iron, hemp, timber, pitch, and corn (maize) were at all times to be regarded as contraband of war, and neutral ships were liable to search even when under convoy.
The League of Armed Neutrality
Offended by the British capture of Malta after Bonaparte had presented the island to him, the Russian emperor Paul, in November 1800 placed an embargo on British ships in Russian ports. On December 16 Russia, Sweden, and Denmark renewed that League of Armed Neutrality which they had first made in 1780, during the American Revolution. The Danes occupied Hamburg, which had become the main entrepôt for Anglo-German trade after the French invasion of Holland, while the Prussians, who joined the League on December 18, invaded Hanover.
Germany and the Baltic States had witnessed much of the expansion of British trade during the previous decade of war, British exports to Bremen and Hamburg having risen 600 percent between 1792 and 1800. The closing of the Baltic Sea and of the German ports and rivers thus struck the most damaging blow at Great Britain’s commerce and war economy. Furthermore, the Baltic States and Germany also supplied most of the materials for British shipbuilding and were the main source of the imports of grain, supplying 5–16 percent of British consumption. As the harvests of 1799 and 1800 were poor, the interruption in shipments was soon felt in a bread shortage.
The assassination of the emperor Paul (March 1801) removed the chief author of the League at a moment when its members had to reckon with British reprisals. A fleet including 18 ships of the line under Sir Hyde Parker had left Great Yarmouth for the Baltic on March 12. On April 2 Horatio Nelson led a vanguard of 12 ships of the line and frigates into Copenhagen harbour. Shore batteries opened fire but, despite orders to retire and the grounding of three of his ships, Nelson continued the Battle of Copenhagen until he had overcome the stubborn resistance of the vessels and hulks anchored there. The Danes agreed to an armistice and made peace on May 28. Sweden had already done so on May 18, and an Anglo-Russian convention followed on June 17. The League was thus dissolved and its forces withdrawn from Hanover, Hamburg, and Lübeck; in return the British modified their maritime claims. The new Russian emperor, Alexander I, moreover gave up the demand for Malta.
The Anglo-Turkish conquest of Egypt
British sea power made possible a further success in the course of the year 1801: the defeat of the army that Bonaparte had left in Egypt in 1799. An expeditionary force of 18,000 under Sir Ralph Abercromby was landed at Aboukir (Abū Qīr) in March, the Turks sent 25,000 to the theatre, and 6,000 sepoys from India arrived via the Red Sea. The 13,000 French in Cairo surrendered on June 28 and the 5,000 in Alexandria on August 30. Nelson’s attack on the flotilla at Boulogne (August 15–16), however, met with failure.
The interval of peace, 1802–03
Meanwhile the British economy was suffering from severe strain. Gold payments rose steeply in 1800 and 1801, for in addition to disbursing £5,600,000 in subsidies and £2,800,000 in their own military expenses in Europe during these two years, the British spent an estimated £19,000,000 on grain imports. The price of wheat had risen to 156 shillings per quarter by March 1, 1801. It fell to 129 shillings in June and to 75 shillings in December.
The Treaty of Amiens
The British government had opened negotiations with France on February 21, 1801. William Pitt, whose place as prime minister had been taken by Henry Addington, approved of this overture not so much because of the collapse of Austria as because of the danger presented by the League of Armed Neutrality. The preliminaries having been concluded on October 1, 1801, the Treaty of Amiens was signed on March 27, 1802. Notwithstanding their reverses overseas, the French recovered all their colonies. The British kept Ceylon (now Sri Lanka, taken from the Dutch) and Trinidad (taken from the Spaniards) but restored Minorca to Spain and Cochin (now Kochi), the Cape of Good Hope, and the Spice Islands (Moluccas) to Holland. France agreed to the evacuation of Naples and the Papal States and to the return of Egypt to Turkey. The British undertook to leave Malta within three months. The island was to be handed back to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, with its neutrality guaranteed by the powers. It was agreed that “an adequate compensation” should be found in Germany for the prince of Orange, William V, who had lost his position in the Netherlands. Though Bonaparte had already ignored his undertaking in the Treaty of Lunéville to observe the independence of the neighbouring republics, the Treaty of Amiens made no reference to nonintervention in their affairs. When later the British government complained that French troops remained in Holland and northern Italy in violation of the Treaty of Lunéville, Bonaparte replied that this was the business of the signatories to that treaty and that he desired “the Treaty of Amiens and nothing but that.” France had asked for British recognition of the Italian republics, but in the absence of compensation for the king of Sardinia this was withheld.
Redispositions in Europe
Representatives of the Cisalpine Republic, summoned to Lyons at the end of 1801 to remodel their constitution, invited Bonaparte in January 1802 to accept the presidency of the republic. It was henceforth to be known as the Italian Republic. Similar arrangements were subsequently made in the Ligurian Republic and in Lucca. Piedmont was brought under direct French rule in September 1802.
In Germany the compensation of the rulers dispossessed by the French was settled by the Reichsdeputationshauptschluss (Principal Decree of the Imperial Deputation) of February 1803. French and, to a lesser extent, Russian influence marked the negotiations by which the ecclesiastical principalities and all but six of the imperial cities were distributed among the displaced princes and the larger German states. The church in Germany lost nearly 2,500,000 subjects, while Prussia gained nearly 400,000. Bavaria’s losses on the left bank of the Rhine were more than compensated by the acquisition of bishoprics and imperial cities to the east; Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Kassel, and Salzburg became electorates. Austria gained some territory but was in effect weakened, since the new settlement not only left the Reich feebler but also lessened the emperor’s voice in its affairs. The coming of peace accelerated Bonaparte’s reorganization of French institutions and overhaul of governmental machinery. His achievement in this field provided the model for countries under French occupation during the following decade.
Economic aspects of the wars
France had a population of 27,350,000 in 1801 as opposed to Great Britain’s 10,942,146 and had gained much territory in the warfare since 1792. However, a significant advance in economic strength was to enable Great Britain to wage war against this formidable adversary and to achieve the “miracles of credit” whereby foreign military assistance could be subsidized. The French, whose manufactures progressed less dramatically than the British and whose seaborne trade had been strangled, found it impossible to raise funds commensurate with their aggressive policy in Europe, so that Napoleon had to rely on the spoils of conquest to supplement the deficiencies of French finance.
Many of the figures for British overseas trade during the period represent official values based on a scale of prices current in the 1690s, regardless of market value. Useful only for comparison, the official scale shows that exports rose from £20,000,000 in 1790 to £53,500,000 in 1814, increasing by 75 percent between 1790 and 1801 and by 51 percent between 1801 and 1814. The total expenditure of the British government in 1793 was £30,590,000, of which war services amounted to £10,340,000 (nearly twice the figure for peacetime); in 1814 these sums had increased to £163,790,000 and £69,070,000 respectively. The steep rise in national income made this possible both by providing immediate revenue and by supplying the funds from which investors lent to the state, whose debts rose from £230,000,000 at the beginning of 1793 to £507,000,000 in 1802 and to £900,000,000 in 1815. For the period as a whole, 35 percent of the addition to the country’s expenditure caused by the war was met from current revenue, and between 1802 and 1813 the proportion of total net governmental income derived from borrowing was never more than 54.7 percent.
Great Britain had superior banking services, could suspend payments in gold at home, and was preponderant in the European money market. France by contrast was financially hampered by a national economy and financial machinery ill-constituted to produce government credit, by the virtual impossibility of inflating the metallic currency, and by potential investors’ lack of confidence in the regime. The deliberate obscurity of Napoleon’s budgetary system makes it difficult to ascertain the exact state of government finances. Among the privy funds that he amassed were (1) the trésor de l’armée (treasury of the army), formed by Austrian and Prussian war contributions and estimated to have furnished 743,000,000 francs between 1805 and 1810; and (2) the domaine extraordinaire of January 1810, largely composed of the territories which Napoleon had retained in the satellite states. These hidden sources of income met some part of French expenditure, and foreign states made further contributions of money as well as troops and supplies, but the disparity between French and British financial resources remains clear. In 1813, when French expenditure was in the region of £40,000,000, the British government was able to borrow £105,000,000 of the £174,000,000 that it spent.
Napoleon’s economic ideas owed much to the outmoded mercantilist school. He hoped to destroy Great Britain’s capacity to make war by closing the European markets to British trade. Yet, when at last he was in a position to do so, the military strength whereby he had enforced his will on Europe was so strained that the Continental powers could break the boycott prematurely and resume hostilities against his widely dispersed armies. Imported grain provided no more than 5 percent of Great Britain’s consumption in normal years and is estimated never to have exceeded 16 percent, though in such periods as 1800–01 and 1811–12 home production of grain fell short of normal demand by 40 percent. There is no evidence that Napoleon ever considered withholding grain from Great Britain in an attempt to force withdrawal from the war: when he did suspend shipments, as in 1811–12, it was because grain was scarce in Europe. At other times his mercantilist views led him to export French grain to Great Britain, provided that France received cash, not goods, in return. For the mercantile marine France had had more than 2,000 ships employed in European and colonial trade by 1792 but possessed only 200 ships of 200 tons or more by 1800, while British strength rose by one-third in ten years to number 19,772 vessels (2,037,000 tons) in 1802 and was to reach 21,869 ships (2,447,831 tons) in 1815. Maritime supremacy enabled the British to dominate the colonial reexport trade (coffee, tea, sugar, spices, cotton and dyes) to the great advantage of their national economy.